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Abstract 
 
Absentee voting is becoming more prevalent throughout the United States. While there 
has been some research focused on who votes by absentee ballot, little research has 
considered another important question about absentee voting: Which absentee ballots are 
counted and which are not? Research following the 2000 presidential election has studied 
the problem of uncounted ballots for precinct voters but not for absentee voters. Using 
data from Los Angeles County–the nation’s largest and most diverse voting jurisdiction– 
for the November 2002 general election, we test a series of hypothesis that certain types 
of ballots and voters have a higher likelihood that their ballots will be counted. We find 
that uniform service personnel, overseas civilians, voters who request non-English ballots 
and permanent absentee voters have a much lower likelihood of returning their ballot, and 
once returned, a lower likelihood that their ballots will be counted compared with the 
general absentee voting population. We also find that there is little partisan effect as to 
which voters are more likely to return their ballots or have their ballots counted. We 
conclude our paper with a discussion of the implications of our research for the current 
debates about absentee voting. 
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1 Introduction
In recent years there has been a dramatic liberalization of absentee voting laws through-
out the United States. For example, in California before 1978, only registered voters who
were disabled, ill, or for other documented reasons could not get to a polling place on
election day could vote absentee; after 1978, any registered California voter could vote
absentee without a documented cause. In the 1978 California general election, 314,258 ab-
sentee votes were cast (4.41% of all votes cast); but by the 2004 general election, 4,104,179
absentee votes were cast (32.61% of all votes cast).1 Another example, Oregon, is widely
considered a leader in absentee voting. In 1998, 58% of the votes cast in their general elec-
tion were absentee ballots, but following the passage of Ballot Measure 60 in 1998, all of
Oregon’s statewide elections are now conducted by mail. The Annenberg National Elec-
tion Survey recently estimated that 20% of ballots cast in the 2004 presidential election
were from absentee voters.2
But absentee voting, especially the liberalization of voting-by-mail, is not without crit-
ics. Some have criticized ”by demand” absentee voting (in contrast to ”by need” absentee
voting) because of fears about voter coercion, the lack of privacy, and the potential for
fraud (Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project 2001). Others have criticized absentee
voting as a mechanism that undermines civic values and might lead voters to cast less
informed ballots, as early voters may not have access to late-breaking campaign infor-
mation (Ornstein 2001). There is also a healthy academic debate about whether or not
the presence of liberalized absentee voting procedures, like those in Oregon, help fuel a
long-term increase in voter turnout (Berinsky et al. 2001; Southwell and Burchett 2000a).
Absentee voting may also help reduce the cost of voting and positively affect turnout
(Aldrich 1993).
A large descriptive literature exists on how absentee voting laws have changed over
time and the potential impact of these changes on election outcomes (APSA 1952; Keyssar
1For a more detailed discussion of the early changes in California’s absentee voting procedures and their
impact see Patterson and Caldeira (1985).
2See http : //www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/naes/220403early%20voting%2032305pr.pdf.
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2000; Martin 1945; Ray 1926, 1919, 1918a, 1918b, 1914; Steinbicker 1938; Winther 1944). In
recent years, research has focused on the factors that lead to increases in absentee voting
(e.g. Dubin and Kalsow 1996a, 1996b; Oliver 1996; Patterson and Caldeira 1985), the im-
pact of absentee voting and other electoral procedures on overall voter participation (e.g.,
Kim et al. 1975; Oliver 1996, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Wolfinger and Rosenstone
1980, Stein and Garcia-Monet 1997), the characteristics of absentee voters (Stein 1998) and
the impact of having the entire population of a jurisdiction vote absentee – as occurs in
Oregon – on overall voter turnout (Berinsky et al. 2001; Hanmer and Traugott 2004; Karp
and Banducci 2000; Southwell and Burchett 2000a, 2000b, 1997). There are also normative
arguments regarding whether absentee voting has other broader impacts on civic values
and the political process (e.g., Gans 2000; Ornstein 2001).
The research literature tends to focus on a single aspects of the absentee voting process
– the actual casting of ballots using the typical absentee voting method, also known as by-
mail voting or postal voting. However, as the 2000 general election showed, the decision
by the voter to cast an absentee ballot is only one aspect of the voting process. After the
ballot is cast, there is a second decision that is made primarily by election officials, who
have to determine whether the ballot cast should be counted. For a variety of reasons,
many absentee ballots (as well as ballots cast in-person at poll sites on Election Day) are
not included in the vote tabulation process. Absentee ballots can be excluded from final
tabulation for a variety of reasons: the ballot is returned to the local election official after
the deadline for accepting such ballots, the information on the outside of the absentee
ballot (which validates its authenticity), is not completed entirely or appears incorrect, the
voter’s eligibility to cast such a ballot is challenged, or the ballot is spoiled in some way.3
This second part of the absentee voting process – the decision whether or not particular
3Ballots that are not included in vote tabulation are sometimes called ”disqualified” ballots (GAO 2001).
Excluded or disqualified ballots are not included in their entirety in vote tabulation; this is in contrast to
”residual votes”, which are ballots on which no votes are counted for specific races because the voter did
not make a discernable indication of preference (”undervotes”), or make more indications of preference
than allowed (”overvotes”). For studies of the latter ”uncounted” votes, see Alvarez and Sinclair (2004),
Ansolabehere (2002), and Tomz and Van Houweling (2003).
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absentee ballots are included in final election tabulation – has been ignored in the research
literature. As increasing numbers of ballots are being cast using the absentee process, it
is important to understand how many absentee ballots are not being counted and who is
casting these uncounted ballots.
Thus, our research focuses on this unanswered question about absentee voting. Which
absentee ballots are counted, and which are not? To answer this question we use data
from Los Angeles County – the nation’s largest and most diverse voting jurisdiction –
for the November 2002 general election to examine both halves of the absentee voting
equation. In the next section we discuss the specifics of our absentee voting dataset, and
in the third section we develop our hypotheses. Then we turn to our empirical results,
and we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our research for the current
debates about absentee voting.
2 Studying Absentee Voting in Los Angeles County
In the empirical analysis we present below we use the ”absentee voter file” (AVF) from
Los Angeles County’s November 2002 general election. This file has a record for every
eligible absentee voter: all permanent absentee voters, all those in vote-by-mail districts,
all of the overseas civilians and military personnel voters, and all others who did not
cast a ballot in a traditional polling place. The AVF records the process used by each
absentee voter to request a ballot; it also records two aspects regarding the resolution of
the ballot request: (1) whether the absentee ballot was returned or not, and (2) if it was
returned whether it was included in the vote tabulation. The AVF also records basic voter
registration and absentee voting information, like party registration, birthdate, and ballot
language. We discuss the details of the specific AVF records that are part of our study
below.
Los Angeles County, California, is the largest and most complex election jurisdiction
in the United States. In the November 2002 general election, there were almost 4 mil-
lion registered voters in Los Angeles County, and almost 5000 voting precincts. There
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were almost 1.8 million ballots cast in the November 2002 election, with almost 390,000
of them coming from absentee voters. In Los Angeles County, election officials are re-
quired to provide all elections materials in six languages in addition to English: Chinese,
Japanese, Korean, Spanish, Tagalog, and Vietnamese. This election cost more than $20
million dollars in administrative costs alone. In California, absentee voters can either
mail their ballot to the registrar or hand-deliver their ballot to a polling place, and their
ballot must be received by 8:00 pm on Election Day. The process of counting and process-
ing absentee ballots is open to observation by interested parties and citizens, and is laid
forth in California Code Section 15100-15112.
The complexity of election administration in Los Angeles County make it an impor-
tant case for study. With the large number of absentee voting requests and ballots cast,
we have sufficient data to study statistically what in other election jurisdictions might be
slivers of the voting population; for an important example, overseas civilian and mili-
tary personnel. Thus, the sheer size of Los Angeles County’s absentee voting population
provides us with more statistical power than we could gain by studying other election
jurisdictions. Second, the political and social diversity of Los Angeles County provides
us the opportunity to study additional questions about absentee voters, especially in our
case the relative ease with which non-English speaking citizens can use the absentee vot-
ing process.
On the other hand, studying only Los Angeles County has limitations. The most im-
portant limitation of our analysis is our focus on one large and urban California county.
Thus, given the unique characteristics of Los Angeles County and the specific nature of
California’s election laws (especially those governing absentee voting), we must be cau-
tious about extrapolating from our results to other election jurisdictions.
3 Previous Research and Hypothesis
One aspect of the absentee voting process that has not been well studied in the research
literature are the many ways in which citizens (here California citizens) can vote outside
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the polling place. First, there is the type of absentee voting that is commonly associated
with the practice: a registered voter completes an absentee ballot form (provided in their
sample ballot, or by third parties like candidates or political organizations) and either
sends it to their county election official or drops it off at an election office; these voters
receive their ballot later by mail, and either return it in the mail, drop it off in person at
an election office or at a polling place on election day, or have an authorized third party
return it for them. In the AVF dataset these voters are separated into two categories –
those who have mailed in their sample ballot to request an absentee ballot and those who
have ”applied by mail” via a third party to request an absentee ballot.4
Second, there are permanent absentee voters. After registered voters request this sta-
tus, they automatically receive absentee ballots in the mail; as long as they return their
ballot in all statewide elections they retain their permanent absentee voter status.5 Under
certain conditions voters can be required to vote by mail, at the discretion of the local
election official: if the voter’s election precinct has fewer than 250 registered voters on the
88th day before an election, the precinct can be declared a ”mail ballot precinct” and all
voters in the precinct are automatically sent absentee ballots.
Third, overseas citizens and military personnel, formally covered by the ”Uniformed
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act” (recently updated by the National Defense Au-
4See ”A Guide to Absentee Voting in California, 2001”, California Secretary of State, Elections Division,
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/Outreach/absentee/links/absgde long.pdf for additional details about
absentee voting in California. In the 2002 election there was another category of absentee voters: those who
voted in a special pre-election period, in person, using electronic touchscreen voting systems. This was the
result of a special pilot project in Los Angeles County; we consider these as early voters, and they are not
included in our analysis below. For research on early voting, see Stein and Garcia-Monet (1997) and Stein
(1998).
5Also, voters who obtain a court order showing necessary cause for their registration information to be
kept confidential are categorized as a type of permanent absentee voter until the election official is informed
that it is no longer necessary to keep the voter’s identification confidential. These voters are denoted in this
way in our dataset and are dropped from the analysis. This special class of absentee voters is covered in
California Election Code Section 2166, which reads in part (Section 2166(a)): ”Any person filing with the
county elections official a new affidavit of registration or reregistration may have the information relating
to his or her residence address, telephone number, and email address appearing on the affidavit, or any list
or roster or index prepared therefrom, declared confidential upon order of a superior court issued upon a
showing of good cause that a life threatening circumstance exists to the voter or a member of the voter’s
household...” Such registered voters will ”Be considered an absent voter for all subsequent elections or until
the county election official is notified otherwise by the court or in writing by the voter” (Section 2166(b)(1)).
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thorization Act of 2002 and the Help America Vote Act of 2002), have an expedited and
simplified registration and absentee ballot request process. These citizens can use the
”Federal Postcard Application,” which simultaneously serves as a voter registration and
absentee ballot request, thus simplifying the process for this group. Also, citizens in this
same group can request ”special absentee voter” status; which, because of their location
or duties makes it impossible for them to vote absentee during the required period. ”Spe-
cial absentee voters” receive their ballot approximately 60 days before the election; all
other requests for absentee ballots made more than 29 days before the election are not
processed until the 29th day before the election.
A final category of absentee voters in California are those who because of illness, dis-
ability, or physical handicap are unable to vote at a precinct polling place and who have
missed the application deadline for requesting an absentee ballot. These citizens can re-
quest an absentee ballot in writing which can be provided to an authorized representative
of the citizen who presents the written application to an election official. The voter, or
their authorized representative, can return the absentee ballot to an election official or to
any polling place in the election jurisdiction. 6
These various categories of absentee voting – which exist alongside poll site voting
in all states but Oregon – show how voters make a series of choices about whether they
want to vote and how they want to vote. Research on absentee voting has traditionally
focused on the behavioral decision by registered voters whether to cast their ballot in
the polling place or by some absentee method, and has focused on the relative differences
between absentee voters, precinct voters, and non-voters, usually employing survey data.
There has been little attention focused on the different types of absentee voters or on the
important political question of whose absentee ballots are returned and then counted.
The latter is a critical question, highlighted by studies of voting in the wake of the
2000 presidential election (e.g., Alvarez and Sinclair 2004; Caltech/MIT 2001; Tomz and
6One final note on the classifications of absentee voters is that in 2002 Los Angeles permitted voters to
go to a select group of polling places before the election and cast a vote on a touchscreen machine. Because
these voters cast early ballots, and because they did in fact vote in a polling place (although not on election
day) we drop them from our analysis even though they are also included in the AVF.
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Van Houweling 2003). Despite conventional wisdom, casting an absentee ballot is not the
same as casting a vote at the polls as the voter does not place their ballot in a box or in the
memory of an electronic voting machine. Instead, they mail their ballot or deliver it to an
election official, and are rarely certain how the ballot is adjudicated.
Absentee ballots can be challenged and not counted in the certified results for a variety
of reasons. The most likely reason why a ballot is rejected is that it is received after the
close of the polls. For example, in California absentee ballots have to be received by
the election officials by the close of the polls on Election Day. However, even if a ballot
is received in time, it can be challenged for other reasons. When the election official
receives a ballot, all of the information on the outside of the ballot that authenticates the
ballot is examined. A voter is required to sign the ballot envelope and provide other
information, such as their address. If the signature does not match or is missing, or the
other information does not match what is on file, the ballot is also rejected.7
Voting for certain absentee populations is also more difficult. Recent studies by the US
General Accounting Office (2001) show that casting a meaningful absentee vote can be
very difficult for individuals who are UOCAVA voters. One key problem is ballot transit
time; a 2001 GAO study found that transit times for first class mail can range from as
little as five days to as much as a month (GAO 2001). Additionally, all voters – including
UOCAVA voters – make errors in completing the forms required for an absentee ballot
request. As the GAO noted,
Military and overseas voters do not always complete absentee voting requirements or
use federal forms correctly. The basic steps that absentee voters must take to
register and request an absentee ballot are similar for all states. Nevertheless,
absentee voting schedules and requirements vary from state to state. In addition,
counties vary in how they interpret and implement state requirements... varying state
and county requirements resulted in confusion among voters about residency
requirements and about the deadlines for registering to vote, requesting a ballot, and
7See Hall (2002) for a detailed discussion of the ballot reconciliation and certification process used in Los
Angeles.
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returning the voted ballot. County officials said that problems in processing absentee
voting applications arise primarily because voters do not fill in the forms correctly or
do not begin the voting process early enough to complete the multiple steps they must
take (GAO 2001, pages 40-41).
In a recent significant study, similar to ours, Imai and King (2004) examined late over-
seas absentee ballots received in the 2000 Florida election after November 7, 2000, which
county canvassing boards deliberated over between November 17 and November 26.8
Imai and King (2004) examined 3739 overseas ballots, of which 2490 were accepted and
counted by canvassing boards; thus, 33% of the overseas ballots received in Florida after
November 7, 2000 were invalidated for various reasons.
Importantly, Imai and King (2004) studied the 2490 overseas absentee ballots received
after November 7, 2000, which were accepted by canvassing boards and included in their
county tabulations. Based on their understanding of the Florida regulations for what con-
stitutes an acceptable overseas ballot, they found that 680 (27%) of the accepted overseas
absentee ballots were flawed. Had these 680 ballots not been accepted, then 52% of the
late overseas absentee ballots would have been rejected in the 2000 Florida election.
The most common flaw found in these ballots was that many had no visible proof
of having been mailed by Election Day. Under Florida law, overseas absentee ballots in
the 2000 election needed an indication (like a postmark or dated signature) to demon-
strate it was mailed before November 7, 2000; 756 ballots did not, and 344 of the counted
ballots had this problem. The second type of flaw involved ballots that did not have a
witness signature or the witness’s complete address; 527 ballots had this flaw, and 96 of
the counted ballots were flawed in this way.
The third most significant flaw in the late overseas absentee ballots was that 327 were
received after November 7, 2000 with a domestic postmark, and 183 of these ballots were
counted; Florida law stated that absentee ballots that are mailed from within the United
8The same data that Imai and King used were reported on by David Barstow and Don Van Natta, Jr.,
”How Bush Took Florida: Mining the Overseas Absentee Vote”,New York Times, Sunday, July 15, 2001, page
1.
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States or territories must be received before November 7, 2000. Next, in Florida overseas
absentee voters can submit two ballots, and only the second ballot is to be counted; the
researchers found 19 instances were both ballots were counted. Last, 69 ballots were
received after November 17, 2000 which was the last day overseas absentee ballots could
be received (10 days after the election), and 5 of these ballots were counted. From Imai
and King’s examination of the late overseas absentee ballots from Florida, we see that
these ballots contained an extremely high number of errors. Many voters cast ballots that
probably should have been rejected.
The Imai and King (2004) study is significant substantively, as it documents major
problems with the absentee voting process for this one category of absentee voters. Over-
seas citizens and military personnel can, just because of the vagaries of both overseas
and domestic mail systems, think they voted when in fact their ballot was not counted.
Their study is methodologically important as well, because they analyze the actual absen-
tee ballots themselves, and thus know which ballots were counted and which were not.
Unfortunately, beyond the Imai and King study, little is known about the resolution of
absentee ballots more generally, and about overseas citizen and military absentee ballots
specifically. The only attempt at a national study was conducted in 2001 by the GAO,
and they prefaced their study by noting that ”many counties could not provide data on
how many absentee ballots they had received from military and overseas voters covered
under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act and howmany of these
ballots they had disqualified” (GAO 2001, page 52). Based on partial data, the GAO es-
timated that 8.1% of military and overseas absentee ballots were disqualified in 2000 in
small counties, relative to a disqualification rate of 1.8% for other absentee voters.9
There are other voting populations that are vulnerable to problems with the absen-
tee voting process. In Los Angeles County, there are six language minorities – Chinese,
Japanese, Korean, Spanish, Tagalog, and Vietnamese – and under the Voting Rights Act
9GAO 2001, page 54. The GAO was unable to provide a national estimate for military and overseas
absentee ballot disqualification rates for the larger counties due to unavailability of necessary information
from such counties.
9
of 1965 and its amendments, the county is required to serve these voters in their native
language. However, many of these voters also are not used to participating in democratic
elections and, even with the outreach efforts of the county and groups assisting language
minority voting populations, many find the absentee voting process difficult to navigate.
In fact, one of the most common reasons why voters contact the Korean American Coali-
tion’s election hotline is to learn more about the election and the general aspects of the
voting process (Hall 2002, 2003).
There is research that has studied the political participation by non-English proficient
citizens. In particular, language proficiency has been shown to be a critical predictor of
participation in recent research (e.g., Citrin and Highton 2002, Tam Cho 1999).10 A lack
of English proficiency can clearly make the process of voting – and in particular absentee
voting – more costly and complicated for a citizen (Downs 1957, Tam Cho 1999). Asian
language minorities – of which there are five in Los Angeles County – have an especially
difficult time developing biliterate skills because almost all have non-Roman alphabetic
writing systems (Loo 1985). This leads us to expect that registered voters who lack English
proficiency will also have difficulty navigating the absentee voting process, and that they
will be less likely to return their absentee ballots and to have their ballots counted.
Thus, based on the previous studies on absentee voting, we have three hypotheses
that we test in this paper. First, we expect that overseas voters will be less likely to return
their absentee ballots and will be more likely to have their ballots challenged upon return.
This hypothesis is based on the results found in the GAO report (2001) and Imai and King
(2004). Second, we also expect to find that voters who use a non-English ballot will be less
likely to return their ballots and will be more likely to have their ballot challenged upon
return. We base this hypothesis on the special problems this class of voters faces regard-
10Lien (1994) indirectly studied language use in the home for Asian- and Mexican-Americans and the
impact it had on a variety of political participation measures, as in his analysis language use in the home
was one of four measures that were collapsed into a single variable called ”ethnic ties”. In his analysis, he
finds that ”ethnic ties” do not impact voter turnout for either Asian- or Mexican-Americans; additionally,
”ethnic ties” do not impact non-voting participatory activities for Asian-Americans, but stronger ”ethnic
ties” has a negative and statistically significant impact on non-voting participatory activities for Mexican-
Americans.
10
ing the basic accessibility of the electoral process, and on past research (Tam Cho 1999)
that demonstrates that language proficiency is an important predictor of political partic-
ipation. Last, we expect to find that absentee voters who have applied for an absentee
ballot specifically in this election, relative to those who are permanent absentee voters
or are in vote-by-mail precincts, will be more likely to return their absentee ballots. This
hypothesis is based on the assumption that registered voters who have taken the active
step of requesting a ballot for the current election are likely to be more interested in the
election and hence more motivated to cast their ballot. We test these hypotheses below
using both bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques.
4 Empirical Results
We begin with a set of descriptive statistics that summarize the absentee voter file from
the 2002 November election in Los Angeles County and the 2000 census data, merged
into the file by ZIP Code.11 We then turn to some multivariate presentations of the data
that test our hypotheses regarding whose absentee ballots are returned and counted. A
set of characteristics emerge which are indicative of low return and count rates from these
analyses.
In Table 1 we provide descriptive statistics regarding the relative frequencies of each
type of absentee voter. ”Sample Ballot” absentee voters are ones who applied for their
absentee ballot using the form provided in their sample ballot materials that were mailed
to their registration address. These absentee voters make up the largest group, at just
over 40% of the absentee voter file. ”Permanent” absentee voters are those who have
requested permanent absentee voting status. In the 2002 general election, these voters
made up almost 31% of those in the absentee voting file. Next were those in the ”Ap-
ply by Mail” category; these registered voters requested an absentee ballot using some
application (most likely provided by a political campaign, party, or interest group), and
11Two groups of absentee voters have been dropped from the analysis. First, as discussed earlier, are the
early, touchscreen voters. The second group are those who failed to provide a birth date on their absentee
ballot application. This second group comprises 72,421 absentee applications.
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comprise 23.19% of those in the absentee voter file. This is an interesting group of vot-
ers; they have been contacted specifically in an effort to increase their participation by
the party paying for mailings so that this group could vote absentee. In fact, in many
states (including California), candidates can ask local election officials for lists of people
who have requested absentee ballots; thus this “tactic could make a critical difference
in a tight election year, especially given the fact that absentee voters are highly likely to
cast their ballots” (Lieb 2004). Patterson and Caldiera (1985) find some effects of partisan
mobilization in absentee voting rates in Republican counties in Iowa and California in
the 1982 election for governor in both of these states, but only in counties with otherwise
high Republican support. They conclude that efforts to increase absentee voting do have
an effect, but that the rates of ballots cast do not favor the Republican party.
Table 1 Goes Here
These three types of absentee voters make up almost 96% of the absentee voter file
in this election in Los Angeles County. The remaining 4% are almost entirely those who
have been classified as ”Vote By Mail” voters. The remaining voters are those who have
requested an absentee ballot in person (”Walk-in” absentee voters, who are 0.29% of the
absentee voter requests), who are ”Overseas” (0.30%), or who requested an absentee bal-
lot due to their inability to get to the polling place because of hospitalization or other
infirmity (the ”Hospital” classification, 0.14% of absentee voters).
The absentee voter file also contained other valuable information about each individ-
ual registered voter: whether they asked for their absentee ballot in English or another
available language, their party registration (Democratic, Republican, Third, or Decline-
to-State), their address (including their ZIP code), and their birthdate. In Table 2 we
provide the basic descriptive statistics for the registered voters in the absentee voter file.
Table 2 Goes Here
The overwhelming tendency of absentee voters was to request an English ballot – only
3.94% requested a non-English ballot. The partisan registration of absentee voters in this
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election was mainly Democratic (about 53%); Republicans were a third of the file (33%).
Only 2.8% of the absentee voters were third party registrants, while over 11% recorded
no party affiliation when they registered. The age distribution of the absentee voters in
Table 2 documents a clear skew towards the older age categories. Only 4.3% of the voters
18 to 25 requested absentee ballots, and a scant 10% of the 26 to 35 year old voters did as
well. However, 25% of those 35 to 50 requested ballots, 29% of those 51 to 65 requested
absentee ballots, and 32% of those over the age of 65.
Next we turn to the question of absentee ballot resolution. For every individual in
the November 2002 absentee voter file we know (1) whether the individual returned their
ballot, and (2) if they returned their ballot, whether it was challenged or counted. We give
the simple statistics for the entire absentee voter population in Table 3.
Table 3 Goes Here
In this particular election, almost one-quarter (24.75%) of the absentee ballots requested
were not returned by voters. Once returned, an additional 4% were returned and chal-
lenged (thus not counted). The way in which these challenged ballots were adjudicated
could have a significant impact onmany races. The percent of returned ballots that are not
counted is 5.47% in this election, a margin large enough to possibly affect many election
outcomes.
The next two tables provide descriptive information regarding whether individual
ballots are returned and are counted, based on ballot request mechanisms and voter char-
acteristics. In Table 4, we give the ballot resolution statistics for the eight different types of
absentee voters. This table shows the percentage for each type of absentee voter who (1)
did not return their ballot, (2) returned their ballot and their ballot was counted, and (3)
returned their ballot but it was challenged and not included in the vote tabulation. The
voters most likely not to return their ballot were those in vote-by-mail precincts (59.88%),
overseas voters (49.41%), and permanent absentee voters (34.85%). Voters who are hospi-
talized, who requested an absentee ballot in person, or who used a sample ballot aremuch
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more likely to return their ballot. The absentee voter categories which are less likely to re-
turn their ballot are also more likely to have that ballot challenged – overseas voters have
almost 10% of their ballots challenged and not counted. Those in vote-by-mail precincts
also have high challenge rates (8%). At the other end of the distribution are walk-in and
sample ballot absentee voters, with about 2% of each of their returned ballots challenged.
Table 4 Goes Here
In Table 5, we present ballot resolution rates for the variables we have for each citizen
in the absentee voter file: language, partisanship, and age. Again, we look first at ballot
returns and then at whether the ballot is challenged and not counted. Beginning with
ballot language, we see that non-English absentee voters are slightly more likely to not
return their ballot, and marginally more likely to have their ballot challenged if returned.
Amongst the partisan groupings, about one-third of third party or decline-to-state absen-
tee voters did not return their absentee ballots, between five and ten percentage points
higher than for either Democrats or Republicans. Furthermore, third party and decline-
to-state voters are marginally more likely to have their absentee ballots challenged and
not included in the tabulation than are Democrats or Republicans. Younger voters are
also more likely to fail to return their ballot and once returned, less likely to have their
ballot counted compared to older voters.
Table 5 Goes Here
Thus far we have only examined relatively simple summary statistics. We cannot say
with much certainty whether some absentee voter types are more or less likely to return
their absentee ballots (for example) than others without using more detailed statistics,
so we now turn to two bivariate logit analyses to better examine our hypothesis. We
are interested in modeling the two-part process we have been calling ballot resolution:
(1) whether an individual returns their absentee ballot or not, and then (2) whether the
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returned ballot is challenged or counted.12
We consider the components individually – we first analyze the factors which deter-
mine whether or not an individual returns the ballot and then in a second analysis (con-
sisting only of those voters who have already returned their ballot) we analyze the factors
which determine whether or not a ballot is counted. We include indicator variables for
the various types of absentee voters: UOCAVA, Sample Ballot, In-person, Hospital, and
Permanent absentee voters. We also include an indicator variable for whether or not
the absentee voter requested an English language ballot, for partisanship (Democrat, Re-
publican, and Decline-to-state), and for the voter’s age.13 Finally, we include ZIP Code
statistics, such as the percent white, percent black, the median income, and the percent
of residents who have been living in the U.S. since 1995. These ZIP Code statistics are
included as control variables.
In the first analysis the dependent variable is coded as a 1 if the ballot is returned and
in the second analysis the dependent variable is coded as a 1 if the ballot is counted (and
this estimation is performed only upon those ballots which are actually returned). These
results are included in Table 6; the most interesting aspect of performing the analysis
in this manner is to note that our predictive probabilities state that on average 75% of all
ballots that are requested will be returned and that of the set of ballots which are returned,
on average 5% will not be counted.
The table is organized with each independent variable in a column followed by the
estimated model coefficient for the event coded as a 1. Below each coefficient is the esti-
12We present our results here as two separate logits for ease of interpretation. These results could be
calculated more efficiently in a multivariate logit model where we specify a dependent variable with three
possible values; an indicator of 1 if the ballot was returned and counted, 2 if the ballot was returned but
not counted, and 3 if the ballot was not returned. Our results presented here in the first analysis collapse
outcomes denoted by 1 and 2 together against outcome 3 and the second analysis compares only outcomes
1 against outcome 2. A simple way to intuit that the two analyses evaluate an identical set of relationships
is to consider the structure of the process – first the voter will either return or not return the ballot and then
only if the ballot is returned can it be counted. Regardless of estimating two bivariate logits or a single
multivariate logit the substantive interpretation of these results is identical so long as the IIA assumption is
valid. (Alvarez and Nagler (1997)
13Note that any observation with a missing data point is dropped from the analysis; in our case we have
approximately seventy-two thousand observations that do not have an age data point. As a consequence
these observations are dropped from the estimation, but this should not affect the estimation process.
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mated standard error. Interpreting these results is a bit complicated; when looking at the
coefficients it is important to remember that their directionality is in reference to the out-
come coded as 1, in the first analysis that is when the ballot is returned and in the second
analysis that is when the ballot is counted. Therefore, a positive coefficient in either of
these two columns implies that as the independent variable increases, the absentee voter
is more likely to return their ballot or to have their ballot counted.
Table 6 Goes Here
Considering the coefficients in this light, note that UOCAVA voters, permanent ab-
sentee voters, and all age groups except the excluded category (age 65 and older) are less
likely to return their ballots. Furthermore, voters who have requested a non-English bal-
lot are also less-likely to return their ballot (since the English coefficient is positive, the
non-English coefficient will therefore be negative). Surprisingly, the percent of residences
who have lived in the same house since 1995 is related to a lower return rate. This would
suggest that voters who live in ZIP Codes with a more mobile population are more likely
to return their ballots. One possible explanation of the sign of this coefficient is that it may
be correlated with latent variables associated with permanent absentee ballots mailed to
voters no longer residing at that address.
Looking at the characteristics which are related to lower count rates, UOCAVA voters,
permanent absentee voters, non-English voters, and all age groups have a lower likeli-
hood of having their ballot counted once returned. These are all conclusions consistent
with our initial hypothesis. In terms of ZIP Code coefficients, the percentage of black res-
idents in a ZIP Code is related to a lower count rate. Unlike the return rate coefficients,
the percent of residents who have lived in in the same house since 1995 are not related to
lower count rates. This result is consistent with the explanation that these ZIP Code statis-
tics are correlated with permanent absentee ballots mailed to voters no longer residing at
the same address.
A quick look at the coefficients from the ”return” logit estimation indicates that Repub-
lican registrants are more likely to return their ballots than Democrats. Note that since the
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party registration coefficients for the ”count” logit estimation are all positive this implies
that the all major party registrants are more likely to have their ballots counted than third
party registrants. Here Republican and Democratic registrants have almost identical coef-
ficient values. Again, UOCAVA voters, permanent absentee voters, and all age categories
are related to lower count rates.
The advantage of performing this two stage analysis is that we may now produce an
interesting counterfactual. First, let us consider a situationwhich is admittedly farfetched.
Suppose all absentee voters who requested a ballot both returned their ballot and that
ballot was counted. Then the profile of absentee voters would look something like the
profile of those voters who simply requested an absentee ballot. Note the percentages of
requests, returns and counts by party in Table 7, however. The party breakdown for those
voters who return their ballot differs only by one small change from those voters who
requested an absentee ballot – the percentage of decline-to-state partisans who will return
drops by a percentage point and the percentage of Republicans increases by a percentage
point. The party breakdown for count rates remains the same. Thus, while there are
differences that we note in the coefficients in the tables above, it is also the case that these
differences are extremely small and should not make a difference in determining election
outcomes.
Table 7 Goes Here
We produce a counterfactual to examine the partisan breakdown of return and count
rates. We are concerned that registrants from one particular party might be more likely
to return their ballots or have their ballots counted then other party registrants, in which
case the use of absentee ballots has the possibility of affecting the election outcome. In
Table 8, the first column indicates actual partisan breakdown of requested ballots and
then the outcome from that breakdown – the percent not returned and not counted –
calculated by fixing each independent variable at its mean and using the coefficients we
estimated in the two-stage logits. Moving from left-to-right, each following column rep-
resents a different possibility for the partisan breakdown of requested absentee ballots
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with the percentage of Republican or decline-to-state registrants decreasing. This mimics
the idea that somehow, for example, the fraction of Democratics requesting an absentee
ballot increases by 10% while the fraction of Republicans (or Decline-to-States) decreases
by 10%. Changing only these percentages, we recalculate the percentage of ballots that
would not be returned or counted. The hypothetical return and count rates associated
with these changes are displayed below each counterfactual. Note that the largest change
is that an additional percent (from 23% to 24%) of ballots are not returned. Thus, a posi-
tive result emerges from this example; that although there are partisan differences in the
rate of returned and counted absentee ballots, these differences are extremely small and
have almost no effect on the return and count partisan percentage breakdowns.
Table 8 Goes Here
5 Conclusion
Increasing numbers of Americans are turning to absentee voting, especially voting by
mail. Absentee voting is undoubtedly a more convenient way for many citizens to partic-
ipate in the electoral process, and election administrators increasingly favor it because it
reduces the number of citizens using traditional polling places to vote. There have been
a number of studies that have looked at the recent rise in absentee voting. This literature
has focused on the impact of voting by mail, either by looking at the effects that absen-
tee voting has on voter turnout or the effects it has on the composition of the electorate.
There have been a number of studies that have looked at the recent rise in absentee vot-
ing. This literature has focused on the impact of voting by mail, either by looking at the
effects that absentee voting has on voter turnout or the effects it has on the composition of
the electorate. Our study is different, as we have a unique dataset that allows us to study
whether absentee votes were counted.
The first step in the absentee voting process is the return of the ballot. We found that
overseas citizens, permanent absentees, and those citizens who requested a non-English
18
ballot were substantially less likely to return their absentee ballot. That these groups are
less likely to return their ballots indicates that they face significant hurdles as they attempt
to participate in the political process. While we do not have information in our dataset
that will allow us to better understand why these two groups are less likely to return
their ballots, we speculate that the overseas voters are undoubtedly facing the sorts of
difficulties highlighted in studies following the 2000 presidential election: the significant
amount of time that it can take for voting materials to be mailed and to be returned.
Language minority voters, by contrast, may find casting their absentee ballot difficult
because of a lack of understanding about the balloting process.
The second step, whether or not the absentee ballot gets counted once it is returned
by the voter, also produced an intriguing result. We found that overseas voters were sub-
stantially more likely to have their absentee ballot challenged and not counted than other
types of absentee voters. Again, we do not have specific information about why overseas
ballots were more likely to be challenged, although we speculate that they are challenged
because they are coming in after the official deadline in California – the close of polling
on Election Day. The GAO study (2001) found that, in counties that provided disqualified
ballot data for military and overseas citizens, approximately 40% of the disqualified bal-
lots arrived after the legal deadline for absentee voting. In some states, such as Florida,
consideration is made for the ballot transit problems encountered by UOCAVA voters.
There, the deadline for receipt of absentee ballots is 10 days after the election. By exam-
ining the post marks on challenged and uncounted absentee ballots, it would be possible
to determine how many ballots would have been counted under various deadline exten-
sions. This policy change also might encourage more UOCAVA voters to return ballots in
the first place.
It is also likely that overseas absentee ballots are being challenged due to other defects,
like missing information on the return envelope. Language minority voters may also
be making errors on their absentee ballot return envelop that result in the ballot being
challenged. Unfortunately, the database we were provided does not indicate why ballots
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were challenged.14
Again, as stated above, race, income, and length of residence play very small, if any,
role in determining whether or not a ballot is returned or counted controlling for the type
of absentee ballot. Other factors are significant, such as whether or not the voter is a UO-
CAVA absentee voter or a permanent absentee voter. This again leads to the conclusion
that ballot type is a large factor in determining these outcomes.
We are encouraged by the partisan breakdown of requests, returns and count rates.
It seems that no single party is returning their ballot or having their ballot counted at a
significantly higher rate than any other party. This implies that regardless of the concerns
we have about return and count rates for specific ballot types, the fact that some absentee
ballot methods produce lower return and count rates does not appear to affect the election
outcome.
We must be cautious in generalizing our results in this paper as we are only studying
one election in one California county. It will be interesting to study other elections in
Los Angeles County, as well as other states and counties, using the actual absentee voter
files. These databases provide a wealth of important information, especially concerning
the administrative issues of who returns their absentee ballots andwhose absentee ballots
are counted.
The 2000 presidential election generated enormous interest in the basic questions of
election administration in the United States. Most of these studies, like the Caltech/MIT
study that estimated that as many as 6 million votes were ”lost” in the election, have
studied polling place and voting system problems. As increasing number of Americans
participate using the absentee voting process, we clearly need to better understand how
the absentee voting process works, who uses it, andwhat problems certain types of voters
14The absentee voting file from the 2002 November election does have a field that indicates the date of
ballot return. 90.5% of the challengedUOCAVA absentee ballots arrived after the legal deadline for absentee
voting. However, there are some apparent inaccuracies with data entered into this field, as it appears that
there are 1114 absentee ballots with return dates after the close of election that were returned and not
challenged. Discussions with Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder staff indicated that this discrepancy
arises from inaccuracies in data entry.
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might encounter as they attempt to participate using the absentee voting process.
6 References
John H. Aldrich, 1993. “Rational Choice and Turnout.” American Journal of Political Science
37: 246-278.
Alvarez, R. Michael and Betsy Sinclair. 2004. Who Overvotes, Who Undervotes, Using
Punchcards? Evidence from Los Angeles County. Political Research Quarterly.
Alvarez, R. Michael and Jonathan Nagler. 1997. ”When Politics and Models Collide:
Estimating Models of Multiparty Elections” American Journal of Political Science. 42: 55-96.
Ansolabehere, Stephen. 2002. Voting Machines, Race, and Equal Protection. Election Law
Journal 1: 61-70.
American Political Science Association. 1952. Findings and Recommendations of the
Special Committee on Service Voting. American Political Science Review. 46, 2: 512-523.
Barstow, David and Don Van Natta, Jr. 2001. How Bush Took Florida: Mining the Over-
seas Absentee Vote, New York Times, Sunday July 15, 2001, page 1.
Berinsky, Adam J., Nancy Burns, and Michael W. Traugott. 2001. Who Votes by Mail? A
Dynamic Model of the Individual-Level Consequences of Voting-by-Mail Systems. Public
Opinion Quarterly, 178-197.
Caltech/MITVoting Technology Project. 2001. Voting: What Is, What Could Be. Pasadena,
CA and Cambridge, MA. http://www.vote.caltech.edu.
Citrin, Jack and Benjamin Highton. 2002. How Race, Ethnicity, and Immigration Shape
the California Electorate. San Francisco, California: Public Institute Policy of California.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
21
Dubin, Jeffrey A. and Gretchen A. Kalsow. 1996a. Comparing Absentee and Precinct
Voters: Voting on Direct Legislation. Political Behavior. 18, 4: 393-411.
Dubin, Jeffrey A. and Gretchen A. Kalsow. 1996b. Comparing Absentee and Precinct
Voters: A View Over Time. Political Behavior. 18, 4: 369-392.
Gans, Curtis. 2000. Mobilization Propels Modest Turnout Increase GOP Out Organizes
Democrats: Registration Lower, Parties In Trouble, Reforms Fail to Boost Turnout. Com-
mittee for the Study of the American Electorate. http://www.gspm.org/csae/cgans9.html
General Accounting Office. 2001. Elections: Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas
Citizens Should Be Improved. GAO-01-1026.
Hall, Thad E. Forthcoming. Public Participation in Election Management: The Case of
Language Minority Voters. American Review of Public Administration.
Hall, Thad E. 2002. LA Story: The 2001 Election. A Century Foundation Report. New
York: The Century Foundation.
Hanmer, Michael and Michael Traugott. ”The Impact of Voting By Mail On Voter Behav-
ior.” American Politics Research, Vol 32 No. 4, July 2004: 375-405.
Imai, Kosuke, and King, Gary. ”Did Illegal Overseas Absentee Ballots Decide the 2000
U.S. Presidential Election?” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 2004), pp
537-549.
Lieb, David A. ”In close election year, political parties taking advantage of state laws to
contact absentee voters directly”, The Associated Press, October 21, 2004.
Karp, Jeffrey A. and Susan A. Banducci. 2000. Going Postal: How All Mail Elections
Influence Turnout. Political Behavior. 22, 3: 223-239.
22
Keyssar, Alexander. 2000. The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the
United States. New York: Basic Books.
Kim, Jae-On, John R. Petrocik, and StephenN. Enokson. 1975. Voter Turnout Amongst the
American States: Systemic and Individual Components. American Political Science Review
69: 107-123.
King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. 2000. Making the Most of Statistical
Analysis: Improving Interpretation and Presentation. American Journal of Political Science
44: 347-61.
Lien, Pei-te. 1994. Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison Between Asian
and Mexican Americans. Political Behavior 16: 237-264.
Loo, Chalsa M. 1985. The Biliterate Ballot Controversy: Language Acquisition and Cul-
tural Shift among Immigrants. International Migration Review. 19, 3: 493-515.
Martin, Boyd A. 1945. The Service Vote in the Elections of 1944. American Political Science
Review. 39, 4: 720-732.
Oliver, J. Eric. 1996. The Effects of Eligibility Restrictions and Party Activity on Absentee
Voting and Overall Turnout. American Journal of Political Science. 40, 2: 498-513.
Ornstein, Robert. 2001. The Dangers of Voting Outside the Booth. The New York Times,
August 3, 2001.
Patterson, Samuel C. and Caldeira, Gregory A. ”Mailing in the Vote: Correlates and Con-
sequences of Absentee Voting”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Nov.
1985), 766-788.
Ray, P. Orman. 1926. Absent-Voting Legislation, 1924-1925. American Political Science Re-
view. 20, 2: 347-349.
23
Ray, P. Orman. 1919. Recent Primary and Election Laws. American Political Science Review.
12, 3: 461-469.
Ray, P. Orman. 1918a. Military Absent-Voting Laws. American Political Science Review. 13,
2: 264-274.
Ray, P. Orman. 1918b. Absent-Voting Laws, 1917. American Political Science Review. 12, 2:
251-261.
Ray, P. Orman. 1914. Absent Voters. American Political Science Review. 8, 3: 442-445.
Rosenstone, Steven J., and Mark Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy
in America. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
Southwell, Priscilla L. and Justin Burchett. 1997. Survey of Vote-by-Mail Senate Election
in the State of Oregon. PS, Political Science and Politics. March: 53-57.
Southwell, Priscilla L. and Justin Burchett. 2000b. Does Changing the Rules Change the
Players? Vote-by-Mail and the Composition of the Electorate, Social Science Quarterly. 81,
4: 837-845.
Southwell, Priscilla L., and Justin I. Burchett. 2000a. The Effect of All-Mail Elections on
Voter Turnout. American Politics Research. 28, 1: 72-79.
Stein, Robert. 1998. Early Voting. Public Opinion Quarterly 62: 57-70.
Stein, Robert and Patricia Garcia-Money. 1997. Voting Early, But Not Often. Social Science
Quarterly 78: 657-677.
Steinbicker, Paul G. 1938. Absentee Voting in the United States. American Political Science
Review 23: 898-907.
Tam Cho, Wendy K. 1999. Naturalization, Socialization, and Participation: Immigrants
and (Non-) Voting. Journal of Politics 61: 1140-55.
24
Tomz, Michael, JasonWittenberg, and Gary King. 2003. Clarify: Software for Interpreting
and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 2.1. Stanford University, University of Wiscon-
sin, and Harvard University. January 5. Available at http://gking.harvard.edu/.
Tomz, Michael and Robert P. Van Houweling, 2003. How Does Voting Equipment Affect
the Race Gap in Voided Ballots? American Journal of Political Science 47, 46-60.
United States Census Bureau, Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Ad-
ministration. 2002. Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2002. http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p20-
542.pdf.
Winther, Oscar Osburn. 1944. The Soldier Vote in the Election of 1864. New York History.
25: 440-458.
Wolfinger, Raymond E. and Stephen J. Rosenstone. 1980. Who Votes. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
7 Tables
Table 1: Types of Absentee Ballots
Type Percent Number
Sample Ballot 40.67 157,931
Permanent 31.63 122,830
Apply by Mail 23.19 90,069
Vote by Mail 3.76 14,618
Walk-in 0.29 1,141
Overseas 0.3 1,182
Hospital 0.14 555
Total 100 388,326
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Table 2: Some Characteristics of Absentee Voters
Characteristics Percent
Language
English 96.06
Non-English 3.94
Party Registration
Democratic 53.15
Republican 32.59
Third Party 2.82
Decline to State 11.44
Age
18-25 4.30
25-35 9.54
35-50 24.80
50-65 29.75
65+ 31.63
Table 3: Absentee Ballot Resolution
Resolution Percent Number
Not Returned 24.75 96,115
Returned and Not Challenged 71.34 277,046
Returned and Challenged 3.91 15,165
Total 100 388,326
Table 4: Ballot Resolution by Absentee Voter Type
Ballot Type Percent Not Percent Not Percent Total
Returned Challenged Challenged
Sample Ballot 14.64 82.60 2.76 157,931
Permanent 34.85 60.41 4.75 122,839
Apply by Mail 23.02 73.06 3.92 90,069
Vote by Mail 59.88 31.37 8.75 14,618
Walk-in 9.20 88.34 2.45 1,141
Overseas 49.41 41.12 9.48 1,182
Hospital 1.80 93.51 4.68 555
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Table 5: Ballot Resolution by Absentee Voter Characteristics
Characteristic Percent Not Percent Not Percent Total
Returned Challenged Challenged
English 24.66 71.45 3.90 373,018
Non-English 27.02 68.84 4.14 15,308
Democratic 25.52 70.48 3.99 206,400
Republican 20.90 75.47 3.63 126,553
Third Party 29.57 65.83 4.59 10,952
DTS 30.96 64.94 4.10 44,421
18-25 42.00 51.55 4.72 16,681
25-35 36.61 58.68 4.72 37,029
35-50 27.84 68.11 4.06 96,286
50-65 20.53 75.98 3.49 115,511
65+ 20.38 76.03 3.59 122,819
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Table 6: Logistic Regression Coefficients, RETURN = 1, COUNT = 1
Variable Return Coefficient Count Coefficient
UOCAVA -.69* -1.1*
(.06) (.11)
Sample Ballot .77* .67*
(.01) (.02)
In-Person 1.39* .88*
(.10) (.19)
Hospital 2.93* .23
(.32) (.20)
Permanent -.53* -.30*
(.01) (.02)
English .14* (.02)
(.02) (.04)
Democrat .21* .25*
(.02) (.05)
Republican .31* .26*
(.02) (.05)
Decline -.04 .11*
(.02) (.05)
Age 18-25 -1.3* -1.17*
(.02) (.04)
Age 25-35 -1.00* -.66*
(.01) (.03)
Age 35-50 -.61* -.37*
(.01) (.02)
Age 50-65 -.17* -.09*
(.01) (.02)
Per. White .005* .001
(.0003) (.0003)
Per. Black .003* -.004*
(.0003) (.001)
Median Income 0* 0*
(.000) (.000)
Per. Same House ’95 -.003* .01*
(.001) (.001)
Constant .87* 2.03*
(.04) (.10)
Observations 388,326 292,211
28
Table 7: Partisan Request, Return and Count Summary
Party Request Percent Return Percent Count Percent
Democratic 53 53 53
Republican 33 34 34
Decline-to-state 11 10 10
Third 3 3 3
Table 8: Counterfactuals by Hypothetical Partisan Request Breakdowns
Party Request Counter- Counter- Counter- Counter-
Percent factual 1 factual 2 factual 3 factual 4
Democratic 53 63 63 73 83
Republican 33 33 23 13 3
Decline-to-state 11 1 11 11 11
Third 3 3 3 3 3
Percent Not-Returned 23 23 23 23 24
Percent Not-Counted 5 5 5 5 5
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